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I.  Introduction 
The world is not always, or perhaps even usually, fully predictable, but some unpre-
dictable events, such as coin tosses, have patterns that are relatively easy to recognize. Such 
patterns may be described probabilistically once the range of events and their relative fre-
quency are understood. Others may not lend themselves to such descriptions, because neither 
the range nor frequency of events are well understood (or perhaps even understandable).  
In cases in which the range and frequency of a class of unpredictable events are well 
understood, a variety of steps can be used to cope with them. Individuals might, for example, 
maximize average returns, rather than actual returns, and simply accept the fact that returns 
will vary from the “expected” value for reasons not fully understood. In cases in which ac-
tions can be chosen after a random event takes place, one might plan for every possible con-
tingency, and once a particular event is observed, the best response to that possibility can im-
mediately be put into action. One may pack for a trip to the beach, and pull out a sweater 
when the evening temperature falls to 15C (60F) and pull out the umbrella and raincoat 
when it begins to rain.  
For unpredictable events with ranges and frequencies that are not completely unders-
tood, similar but not equivalent steps, can be taken. It is, for example, possible to maximize 
average “subjective” returns based on intuitive assessments of the relative frequency of possi-
ble events, even when only a subset of the actual possibilities are known. It is also possible to 
form contingent plans based on the possibilities of which one is aware. However, if the range 
and connections among events are not completely understood, subjective estimates of proba-
bilities will not be accurate and it will not be possible to have a conditional plan that accounts 
for every event that may occur. One may pack a sweater and umbrella for a trip to the beach, 
but have no idea about what to do when the tsunami alarm goes off. Indeed, one may not even 
understand the meaning of a tsunami siren, or warning announcement in Japanese, even if one 
hears the siren and warning and knows what a tsunami is.  
This paper attempts to develop a framework for analyzing decisionmaking in settings 
in which ignorance affects expectations, plans, and actions. The analysis is grounded in ra-
tional decisionmaking models, but focuses on a somewhat neglected informational problem, 
that of ignorance. A variety of informational problems and their consequences are routinely  
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analyzed by economists, but both rational and natural ignorance tend to be ignored. Yet, prob-
lems associated with ignorance are sufficiently commonplace in real life that people devise 
private and public routines for addressing them. Many of these attempt to reduce the down-
side risks of unpleasant surprises.  
The first part of this paper provides a rational choice explanation for ignorance 
grounded in information costs and explores a few implications that are relevant for economic 
theory. Ignorance limits possibilities for unbiased estimates and implies that mistakes and 
surprise are possible. All three of these possibilities are neglected in most rational choice 
models. The second part of the paper suggests that people may learn from mistakes associated 
with ignorance, but not in the manner proscribed by Bayesian learning functions. How ignor-
ance is reduced is a nontrivial methodological issue, although we know it to be possible. The 
third part of the paper analyzes how people cope with mistakes and surprise events. Once the 
possibilities of mistakes, surprises, and crises are recognized, systematic steps will be taken to 
attempt to reduce losses from them, although these steps will necessarily be less than perfect.  
The choice settings of interest for this paper are those Frank Knight (1921) referred to 
as involving uncertainty. Knight argued that managing downside risk for well-understood 
probabilistic events is possible through prepaid (ex ante) insurance programs. He went on to 
suggest that insurance markets were not always possible, because of uncertainty, and so eco-
nomic profits – and presumably losses – were possible in competitive markets. The problems 
addressed in this paper have also been analyzed by Shackle many times (1969, 2010), al-
though from a different methodological perspective. Among contemporary game theorists, 
Binmore’s work on “large worlds” (2011) is most similar to the perspective developed below. 
In a world in which ignorance is important, one cannot often ‘look before one leaps’. Knight 
focused much of his attention on profits; this paper focuses mostly on losses. Managing 
downside risks in settings where unpleasant surprises are commonplace is difficult.  
For most of the purposes of this paper, it is sufficient to focus on how decisions about 
data collection can affect expectations, choices, and consequences. Problem associated with 
costly data collection imply that systematic mistakes, surprises, and crises (emergencies) are 
possible for forward-looking consistent decisionmakers. Similar conclusions could also be 
reached by assuming that the “data” are perfect and complete, but that processing time is di- 
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vided among observations in various ways, or biased because of faulty mental models, syste-
matic computing errors, or self-delusion. These informational processing problems are real, 
but are not necessary to produce the problems focused on in this paper. For most of this paper, 
it is assumed that the information collected is used as well as possible.
1 An exception is the 
section on crisis management in which problems of surprise are likely to be magnified by 
calculation errors associated with rapid decisionmaking. 
 
II. Ignorance and Mistakes as Consequences of Information Costs 
A good deal of information is free. One gets it as part of ordinary activities without 
making any special effort to obtain it. Some of that information is about relatively simple nat-
ural processes, and so it takes relatively little effort to turn it into knowledge about the world 
that can be used in one’s day-to-day planning and decisionmaking. A switch on the wall de-
termines whether a light is on or not, and once this is understood, the switch can be turned on 
to provide additional light when it is darker than optimal for the activities at hand. Other in-
formation requires significant investments of time, attention, and money to acquire and trans-
form into useful knowledge. A good deal of information only partly describes complex phe-
nomena for which causal connections are multidimensional. In any area where several factors 
(A, B, C, D, E, etc.) jointly determine variables of interest (X, Y, and Z), mastering the details 
may take considerable time, attention, and money. In cases in which the conclusions reached 
are used to rank alternative actions (H, I, and J), it is clear that mistakes are possible, especial-
ly when the relationships of interest are difficult to understand and to calibrate once unders-
tood.  
For example, most economists and policy analysts spend many years mastering spe-
cialized modes of reasoning and becoming familiar with various statistical measures of eco-
nomic activity in narrow subfields of economic policy. In such cases, information is not free 
and individuals and organizations will naturally optimize with respect to collecting and 
processing it in a variety of ways, including the hiring of “expert” economists.  
                                                 
1 Only honest mistakes in data collection and analysis are discussed in this paper. Feigenbaum and Levy (1996) 
discuss how preferences over estimates may affect scientific work.   
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A.  An Illustration: estimating the value of a determinant process with partial 
data  
Individuals and group plans are often conditioned on the values of physical or social 
phenomena, because such phenomena partly determine the consequences of individual and 
group decisions. For farmers and their communities, the last day of frost or high water mark 
of a nearby river in the current year will affect what is produced from a given crop and plant-
ing date. For a tourist, the expected temperature and rainfall will affect what clothing to bring, 
and the actual temperature and rainfall will affect what is worn and which sites will be most 
enjoyable to visit in a given country on a given day. For an investment house, investment 
strategies vary with estimates of risk-free long-term interest rates and market volatility. For an 
environmental agency, the extent to which the average temperature of the earth is affected by 
future natural and social processes will affect its recommendations on a broad range of micro-
economic and macroeconomic policies.  
There are a nearly endless range of physical and social phenomena on which people 
base their plans and policies, because these determine the consequences and rewards of the 
actions specified by those plans and policies.  
For the purposes of illustration, consider a series of decisions by Alle, who makes in-
formational, planning, and action choices. Assume that the variable of interest, X (perhaps the 
last frost date), is determined by four other variables, A, B, C, and D (perhaps length of day, 
average cloud cover, average wind direction, and latitude). Suppose further that the causal 
relationship is a simple linear one (which would probably not be the case for the last day of 
frost) and can be written as:  
 
Xt = aAt + bBt + cCt +dDt,          ( 1 )  
 
where a, b, c, and d are constants and At, Bt, Ct, and Dt are the values of A, B, C, and D at 
time t. Suppose that, given the values of A, B, C, and D in year t, one can predict Xt perfectly.  
Assume Xt is for some reason impossible for Alle to observe directly at the time that 
knowing X would be useful for planning purposes, or at least is more difficult to observe than 
the other variables, and so is normally estimated from a model of some kind. Xt might, for 
example, be observable only after the event, as with the last frost date in the growing season 
of interest. Suppose that the values of A, B, C, and D, are generated by time-independent  
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processes and that the processes for A, B, and D, can be represented as three uniform random 
processes with mean 0. Variable C, for some reason, is generated by a different process, and 
has for some time taken a constant (steady state) value, with Ct = Ct-1 = 0. (These simplifying 
assumptions help remind us that real-world phenomena are normally much more complicated 
and more difficult to know than we often assume for the purposes of building tractable mod-
els – which is, paradoxically, what makes models useful.) 
Together, these assumptions imply that the unconditional expected value of X is zero, 
but that the conditional expected value at time t differs from zero according to the values of 
A, B, and D at time t. Because plans (strategic choices) at time t can be improved by knowing 
Xt, it may be worth collecting past information about A, B, C, and D, so that a, b, c, and d can 
be estimated. Given those estimates, information about At, Bt, Ct, and Dt would also be useful, 
so that precise estimates about Xt can be made and more profitable decisions made at time t.  
How much data and what kind of data Alle will gather depends on both information 
costs and the expected improvement in outcomes generated by knowing Xt. Suppose that data 
on A are cheaper to collect than data on B, which are cheaper to collect than data on C, which 
are cheaper to collect than data on D. This presents Alle with an informational choice con-
cerning the amounts of each type of data to collect. I have argued elsewhere (Congleton 2001, 
2005, 2007) that the corner solutions at which no information is gathered about a subset of the 
variables is the proper meaning of rational ignorance. Such corner solutions are clearly possi-
ble solutions to Alle’s informational choice.   
To illustrate the difference between general (unconditional) and specific (conditional) 
estimates, it is sufficient to consider cases in which the values of A, B, C, and D differ from 
zero. For example, if they take the value 1 at time t, the true value of Xt will be Xt = a+b+c+d, 
which clearly differs from zero. Zero in this case is a biased estimate, given the information 
about A, B, C, and D that is potentially available. Smaller degrees of (conditional) bias may 
occur when only partial information about the values at t is collected, although not in all cas-
es. For example, in the above case, if only information about A and B are collected, the value 
of X is predicted (estimated) to be a+ b. Bias falls if a+b is closer to a+b+c+d than zero is. 
This would be the case if all a, b, c, and d > 0. However, bias may actually increase if a+b > 0 
and c+d <0. In such cases, as the saying goes, “a little information may be a dangerous thing.”   
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Note that this illustration demonstrates several points that are relevant for thinking 
about rational choice in settings with high information costs. First, there is a difference be-
tween conditional and unconditional estimation. A phenomenon may have a well-behaved and 
easily computed expected value for unconditional forecasts – here 0 – without making the 
phenomenon of interest easy to predict in the conditions at hand. Second, time-relevant esti-
mates often require specific information, as well as good estimates of the causal connections 
among variables. To estimate Xt requires values for a, b, c, and d, and also data for At, Bt, Ct, 
and Dt. Third, ignorance of any of the relevant parameters or variables at time t implies that 
estimates will be biased at time t. One cannot be simultaneously rationally (or naturally) igno-
rant and have rational expectations unless the neglected variables are all irrelevant for the 
estimate at hand. An unbiased forecast cannot be made without timely and relatively complete 
information (observations about all relevant variables). 
B.  Mistakes: Choosing Plans with Less than Perfect Estimates 
The previous section demonstrates that that rationality, in the sense of unbiased expec-
tations, may not be possible when information costs are significant and causal chains are 
complex. We next examine how Alle’s choices may be affected by the use of such imperfect 
estimates.  
Figure 1 (below) can be used to illustrate several kinds of mistakes that might be asso-
ciated with Alle’s estimates of the value of Xt. Figure 1 characterizes a game against nature in 
which a sequence of choices must be made and the best plan depends partly on an accurate 
assessment of the initial circumstances. The initial decision node (1, 2, or 3) is determined by 
the value of Xt. As noted above, Xt may be, for example, the number of days with tempera-
tures below 0C (32F) during the growing season in year t, the high water mark for the sea-
son, Alle’s ability or mastery of three subareas of economics, or the present and future states 
of an organization’s internal job market. The payoffs might, for example, represent profit as-
sociated with Alle’s crop production in an area that is prone to frost or flooding, grades from 
a sequence of courses in economics, or income produced by career choices within a particular 
large organization.
  
The first “rational step” is assumed to be “obvious;” it is not affected by the value of 
X and the associated initial decision node. However, the best next step depends on which de- 
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cision tree (subgame) Alle is really on (in). In the case of interest, the value of Xt is deter-
mined by exogenous factors (nature), but in other similar choice settings, it could be a conse-
quence of deliberate choices made by others in the contest of interest. There are many choice 
settings in which the value of some variable (or vector) Xt determines which decision tree 
(subgame) one is actually on. 
In “normal” times, X takes values clustered around zero and the second node with its 
associated decision tree is the one most often faced. (A weighted sum of independent un-
iformly distributed random variables is normally distributed.) However, circumstances are not 
always typical, so Alle may or may not be at node 2. 
 It is interesting to note that Alle’s choice of methodology influences her decision 
when she remains rationally ignorant about X. For example, if she decided to collect no in-
Figure 1
Making Decisions When Circumstances Are Not Clear
X < -1 X   0  X > 1
1.1 1.2 1.3 2.1 2.2 2.3 3.1 3.2 3.3
1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 2.2.1 2.2.2 2.2.3 2.3.1 3.2.2 3.3.3
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formation about A, B, C, and D (or X) and has chosen M in stage 1, Alle does not know 
whether she is at node 1.2, 2.2, or 3.2. If she uses the Bayesian approach (with diffuse priors), 
she will be indifferent among second-stage choices, because the expected value of each 
second-stage strategy is 7/3. If she is a maxi-min player, she will prefer the L and R strategies 
in the second stage to M. If she is an expected value player (as many economic models as-
sume and policy analysts appear to be), she will assume that she is initially at decision node 2 
and adopt the middle course of strategy at both the first and second decision point.  
The difference between the realized payoff and the payoff potentially available with 
perfect information is one meaning of “mistake.” It is clear that mistakes in this sense can be 
made under all three methodologies, according to the true value of Xt, and thus the best plan 
from the initial starting point. It is also possible that one of the methodologies on average 
yields results that Alle finds more pleasing than she does other results, but does not know this 
beforehand. As time passes, she may also come to believe that she has been using the wrong 
methodology. Higher-level mistakes are often more persistent than wrong decisions at an in-
stant in time, because evaluating their relative merits requires more information than many 
lower-level decisions. It is often difficult to evaluate alternative methodologies without de-
tailed knowledge of the circumstances in which they are to be employed. Nonetheless, all 
these methods are sensible ways of coping with acknowledged ignorance.  
Of course, knowing the possibility of mistaken choices, Alle may invest in informa-
tion about A, B, C, and D in order to reduce her uncertainty about which node is actually her 
starting point. A better estimate of X provides Alle with more precise knowledge of her posi-
tion and thus the payoffs associated with her choices. In the example, perfect information in-
creases the average payoff from 7/3 to 4, nearly doubling her payoff. However, even perfect 
information is not infinitely valuable, so ignorance may still be a sensible choice if informa-
tion about A, B, C, and D is costly. In this case, if the cost of information about A, B, C, and 
D is greater than 5/3, remaining rationally ignorant about X may be optimal.
2  
In such cases, having biased expectations may be regarded as a “rational choice” and 
the consequences of that choice on one’s subsequent actions may also be regarded to be a 
                                                 
2 Information in the setting characterized is more valuable in the long run (in second-stage choices) than in the 
short run (first-stage choice), so how much information Alle acquires is also affected by her time discount rate 
and degree of risk aversion.  
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consequence of forward looking decisionmaking. In this sense, both biased expectations and 
systematic mistakes are consistent with rational choice. Alle may make systematic mistakes, 
but have no regrets.  
 
III. Learning from Mistakes: Natural Ignorance, Surprise, and Regrets 
If neither biased expectations nor failures to choose optimal strategies can be called 
mistakes or “irrational,” is there any behavior that can be? Is there forward-looking consistent 
behavior that can produce regrets? We now shift from the rational ignorance case to the natu-
ral ignorance case; that is, from settings in which individuals know all the variables (dimen-
sions) that can possibly be sampled to settings in which some possible dimensions of data, 
decision trees, or strategies are initially unknown. Natural ignorance occurs when only a 
proper subset of the potentially available variables and relationships are initially known.  
The multidimensionality of all but the simplest phenomena imply that ignorance is 
commonplace and also that ignorance does not automatically diminish as sample size or ex-
perience, per se, increases. Rational ignorance can be reduced by gathering information about 
variables known to exist, but about which one had previously gathered no information. Re-
ducing natural ignorance requires the discovery of previously unknown variables. In sampling 
terms, reducing natural ignorance requires tabulating previously unknown characteristics of 
the potential sample at hand. 
Natural ignorance generates the same sorts of biases and mistakes as rational ignor-
ance. Decisionmakers will tend to have biased expectations (e.g., ones not fully conditioned 
on all relevant variables) and will make mistakes in the sense that they achieve outcomes that 
are inferior to others that are available to them – at least in principle. In addition, surprises 
may occur, completely unanticipated events may occur. A fully rational individual who neg-
lects relevant dimensions and parameters cannot avoid systematic mistakes and surprise, ex-
cept through blind good fortune.  
Natural ignorance also allows the possibility of rational regrets. Both natural and ra-
tional ignorance cause rational individuals to systematically reach mistaken conclusions about 
the world, regardless of the extent of their experience (sample size) with the setting of inter-
est. However, when one is naturally ignorant, one may learn things that are completely new  
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about the decision environment – at least to the relevant decisionmaker. Such surprises are not 
always pleasant ones, but both pleasant and nasty surprises may cause one to regret previous 
decisions – for example, to regard previous informational decisions as mistakes – “I should 
have known better.”  
A.  Different Modes of Learning 
In the previous cases, Alle was assumed to know what she knows and does not know. 
This allowed informational decisions to be made, which influenced her subsequent planning 
decisions and actions. We now examine cases in which she may not know what she does not 
know.  
In a setting in which natural ignorance exists, two sorts of learning are possible. First, 
Alle may gain additional precision about variables that she already knows – for example, ad-
ditional data about A, B, and C may allow more precise estimates of a, b, and c to be made. 
Second, she may learn about new previously unknown variables and possibilities. For exam-
ple, variable D might not initially have been known and might be discovered in the course of 
experience or experiments. It is also possible that Alle did not know that decision node 3 ex-
isted or that choice R could ever therefore be sensible. Indeed, choice R itself may not have 
been known or considered. (Why learn the shortest way from the beach to high ground, if one 
has never confronted or heard about tsunamis?) 
The first sort of learning can be modeled using the conventional statistical (Bayesian) 
models of learning. The reduction of natural ignorance cannot be so readily modeled, which is 
one reason why most economic analysis tends to neglect it (and a related activity, innovation). 
Eliminating natural ignorance involves a quite different process of learning than routine statis-
tical sampling does.  
To see this, recall that the posterior probability of event s, given that m has occurred, 
is the probability of s times the probability of observing m, given that s is true, divided by the 
probability of event m. 
 
P ( s | m )   =   [ P ( s )   F ( m | s ) /   F ( m )   ]        ( 2 )    
 
If the probability of s is initially assigned a value of zero, P(s) = 0, whether implicitly or ex-
plicitly, the posterior probability will always be zero whatever the actual probabilities of m  
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and m given s may be. This holds regardless whether P(s) is assumed to be zero or if one is 
totally ignorant of the existence of s and so no probability is assigned to it.  
Bayesian updating allows refinements of theories that can be represented as condition-
al probability functions over known events, but not refinements over events ruled out a priori 
or completely ignored. Learning about “missing dimensions” involves processes that are fun-
damentally different from Bayesian updating and similar statistical representations of learn-
ing. Priors are not updated when ignorance is reduced, but, rather, new priors are created for 
previously unrecognized possibilities.
3 
B.  Learning from Mistakes 
Quasi-Bayesian learning may be useful as long as the results are satisfactory and some 
convergence is evident. Breaks with this method, innovation or discovery, may be triggered 
by major failures of that technique, for example, when “impossible” events occur. Systematic 
errors (when observed) may induce one to reconsider one’s premises, look more carefully for 
new variables and models, and to drop others. When new variables or connections are discov-
ered, one can be said to “learn more from one’s mistakes than from one’s successes.” Mis-
takes can induce innovation.  
For example in figure 2, the initial theory may consist of a conditional probability 
function that maps set A to set B. If it is subsequently observed that outcomes in the larger 
set, B’, are also associated with events in set A, the theory could be broadened to include 
these possibilities. The result would necessarily reduce the probability that (at least some) 
specific elements of A cause specific events in B, because the probability of landing in B giv-
en A is now recognized to be less than 1. When the world grows larger and more complex, 
rather than smaller and simpler, probabilistic relationships become less rather than more cer-
tain, because probabilities are spread out over a larger domain of possibilities. Nonetheless, in 
this example events in A can be said to explain more of the universe than previously believed. 
                                                 
3 Binmore (1992, p. 488) suggests that a complete list of possible outcomes is not even conceptually possible or 
at least is beyond the capacity of real decisionmakers. Frydman (1982) argues that agents cannot generally com-
pute optimal forecasts in competitive markets, because they cannot estimate the forecasts of all other agents. 
Cyert and DeGroot (1974) provide an early analysis of the relationship between Bayesian learning functions 
and rational expectations. They note many cases in which Bayesian learning converges toward rational expecta-
tions. However, they also note failures (inconsistencies) in cases in which the model used by individuals (firms) 




In the illustrative choice setting developed above, Alle may not initially realize that 
node 3 exists and experience a setting in which strategy M generates a payoff of zero. This is 
impossible if only nodes 1 and 2 exist, which may induce Alle to consider new previously 
unconsidered possibilities. In this manner, unexpected or impossible outcomes may suggest 
the existence of alternatives of which one had been entirely unaware.  
If Alle initially knew of nodes 1 and 2, and remains otherwise uninformed after learn-
ing about node 3, her Bayesian priors fall from 0.5 to 0.33 after she learns about the existence 
of node 3. She becomes less, rather than more, certain about which node she is at. This con-
trasts with statistical notions of information based on Shannon and Weaver’s (1949) pioneer-
ing work on information theory. Within such theories, additional information tends to reduce 
the variance of the estimates of relevant model parameters. This will not occur if the “new” 
larger world is more complex (or uncertain) than the “old” world.  
Mistakes generated by natural ignorance are analogous to those developed for rational 
ignorance.  However, natural ignorance is not rational, and previous choices can be regarded 
to be suboptimal-mistakes – both informationally and practically given the costs and benefits 










Theories as Mappings  
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earlier, she might honestly regret not having invested in discovering that possibility at an ear-
lier point on the decision tree. 
Unfortunately, it is not always possible to learn from one’s mistakes, because some 
missing dimensions and relationships are extremely difficult to recognize (distill from expe-
rience). Here one might reflect on all the new physical relationships discovered in the past 
two centuries that would have been very useful a thousand or two thousand years earlier. 
 
IV. Coping with Unpleasant Surprises  
An unpleasant surprise occurs when an unexpected event provides information (often 
freely available) that makes one subjectively or objectively worse off. Some, but not all, un-
pleasant surprises may induce one to change one’s plans and models of the universe. A subset 
of those surprises may induce rapid revisions in one’s immediate plans, because existing 
plans are found to be less effective or more dangerous than previously thought. Alle’s plan to 
take action M, because she thought she was at node 2.2, would be revised once she realized 
that she was at node 3.2, although it might not be immediately obvious that R was the best 
strategy  
In some cases, one’s existing plans may need to be revised quickly to avoid or reduce 
great losses. This is what we normally mean by the term “crisis.” In other cases, one may 
have time to analyze the best response and may invest in knowledge that previously seemed 
too costly to be worth undertaking. In the Alle example, an unpleasant surprise may induce a 
more careful consideration of R, which previously had attracted little attention, because it was 
never useful. Finding oneself in an “impossible” position may induce previously neglected 
actions to be examined more carefully and new strategies adopted. 
The time pressure associated with crises tend to reinforce the likelihood of mistaken 
choices. That an event is a surprise implies that it was unanticipated and unplanned for. Thus, 
a crisis normally requires making new plans in circumstances that were not previously fully 
known or analyzed. This is rarely easy and is often impossible. For example, learning that 
node 3 of figure 1 exists and that strategy R is possible and effective may require more inno-
vation and analysis by Alle than is possible during the period in which a decision has to be 
made. As a consequence, she may simply play the “safe” strategy M, which yields the worst  
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of the possible in the new circumstances. 
As this example demonstrates, natural ignorance is a sufficient condition for unplea-
sant surprises to emerge within a rational choice framework. It also demonstrates that the 
terms surprise and crisis have little meaning under conventional assumptions. Had the full set 
of decision trees been known and analyzed, as usually assumed in game theoretic analyses, 
Alle would simply have adopted R without hesitation. Without natural ignorance and decision 
costs, finding oneself at node 3 could not be a surprise and the need to evaluate new strategies 
could not be a crisis. Had rapid adjustments not been necessary, care could have been taken to 
understand the consequences of actions at Node 3, as well as possible. Thus, mainstream ap-
proaches rule out the possibilities of surprise, crisis, and mistakes.  
However, if unpleasant surprises and mistakes are commonplace experiences, it is 
possible that people will devise plans to reduce their frequency and losses generated by them. 
Such steps can be analyzed using more or less standard ideas from rational choice-based so-
cial science. That particularly unpleasant surprises and crises are unanticipated does not mean 
that routine procedures for handling crises cannot be designed and implemented. It simply 
means that perfect solutions are not likely to exist and that improvements are always possible.  
A.  Robust plans and error correction as methods for dealing with surprise 
The informational nature of both mistakes and crises imply that a variety of steps can 
reduce losses associated with them.  
One step that can be taken is the development of robust plans. Plans made in settings 
in which it is well understood that some possibilities are unknown, or occur with unknown 
probabilities, normally include “fudge factors” (large reserve capacity) that enable the plans 
or organizations to function reasonably well even if surprising or unlikely circumstances have 
to be confronted. Such plans make sense in many stochastic settings, but are especially useful 
when surprise events are considered likely. The more likely and larger the “anticipated” sur-
prises, the more important robustness will be for a plan’s success.  
Planners will also acknowledge that unpleasant surprises can be consequences of cal-
culation and analytical errors, as well as ignorance of possible events. Decisions made in 
complex circumstances thus also include routines for discovery and correction of policy mis-
takes at relatively low cost. This is, of course, one reason why elections in democracies are  
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relatively frequent. Similar considerations evidently inform emergency policies that have 
“sunset” provisions, so that they expire or are carefully reviewed after a crisis has passed and 
better information becomes available. 
A fine-tuned plan or design may fit a particular set of circumstances very well, but not 
function nearly as well under different circumstances. A well-designed bridge may be able to 
handle all “normal” loads, but may collapse if loads are surprisingly large or the wind un-
usually strong. To deal with the unknown (as well as undetected construction and design er-
rors), a robust bridge is designed to carry loads far greater than anticipated or than actually 
occur. Moreover, after a bridge fails, the result will not usually be simply regarded as a sto-
chastic event. Rather, efforts will be made to understand what, if anything, caused the failure. 
If a cause is identified, it will be taken account of in future designs. 
Such “fudge factors” and error correction procedures would be wasteful in a world 
where all possibilities are known and no mistakes are made, but are completely sensible in a 
setting in which surprises are commonplace.  
B.  Research and development: “brainstorming” as a method of reducing un-
pleasant surprises 
As long as robust plans can absorb the surprises experienced, the usual conclusions of 
mainstream rational choice models will tend to apply, although those models will not account 
for fudge factors and error correction, because the latter would be unnecessary in the usual 
rational choice models. Decisions will be consistent through time and appear to be based on 
unbiased expectations. No mistakes will be evident. However, an “unusually” large surprise 
or mistake, or series of small surprises and mistakes can overwhelm even relatively robust 
plans and organizational designs.  
That such surprises result from natural ignorance implies that it is possible to reduce 
the frequency of unpleasant surprises by investigating possibilities and planning for unlikely 
(or impossible) events before they happen. For example, a person or group may try to reduce 
natural ignorance by thinking broadly about possible scenarios. This is a nontrivial task; how-
ever, by studying past crises in a broad range of countries it is often possible to learn new 
possibilities and new scenarios without breaking entirely new ground. In some cases, research 
can convert surprises into predictable, or at least well understood, phenomena. In other cases,  
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the research may reveal that a wide range of unpleasant surprises usually produce a far nar-
rower range of unpleasant consequences.  
Consider a broad class of surprise events that fall in set A (of figure 2) and generate 
consequences scattered throughout set C. Suppose that many of these were unique events with 
many different characteristic, but that historical frequencies suggest that the consequences of 
A-type surprise events fall mostly within set B. In such cases, the consequences may be easier 
to condition plans on (and be better understood) than the phenomena that generate them. 
(Rain and wind produce surprise events with a wide variety of consequences, but most conse-
quences fall within well-understood ranges.) Even if one does not know exactly why an event 
happens, nor cannot predict when it will happen, to take steps that reduce the losses from its 
most common consequences.  
Common features of the consequences generated by quite different surprise events, of-
ten allow a relatively simple robust conditional plans to be devised, which reduce the losses 
generated from most such events. For example, one can never fully anticipate the exact time 
and place of an earthquake, flood, contagious disease, or terrorist attack, but many of the con-
sequences of such events are similar. There will be disruptions of ordinary markets for life’s 
necessities and medical problems that can be addressed by creating one or more organizations 
that can provide health services, food, water, and shelter on short notice. As responses are 
worked out, the losses associated with such unpleasant surprises may be bounded, although 
the surprises continue.  
Associated institutions and robust response plans may be so successful, that many 
such surprise events stop being considered crises, as crimes and fires are not often regarded as 
crises, although particular instances differ in surprising ways and the results are nearly always 
unpleasant.  
C.  Ex post crisis insurance and bailouts as responses to unpleasant surprises 
A common method for bounding the losses associated with unpleasant surprises is ex-
post social insurance. The person’s receiving the “insurance payout” are those harmed by an 
unpleasant surprise and (at least in principle) only those harmed. However, unlike ordinary 
insurance, ordinary premiums sufficient to pay for the insurance was not paid by the pool of 
potentially parties. A robust emergency insurance program may have reserves (stocks of food,  
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clothing, shelter, and medical supplies) sufficient to deal with “commonplace emergencies” 
but not “unusually” large ones.  
Such “bailout” programs may be devised by groups that have similar exposures to un-
pleasant surprises or by a government that represents large numbers of persons exposed to 
such risks and uncertainties. Not everyone in such groups may be subject to the same surprise 
events, because of regional differences in the historical frequencies of various unpleasant sur-
prises (hurriacanes, earthquakes, river flods, tornados, epidemics, power outages, etc.). How-
ever, insofar as the responses (pay outs) to the surprise events are similar, the same reserves 
and delivery programs can be used to address consequences associated with a variety of un-
pleasant surprise events.  
Again such programs may robust, with large reserves, but still occasionally be over-
whelmed at which point payment for the coverage (bailout) can only be provided after the 
fact. Reserves may be entirely consumed, and more, by a particularly large, unpleasant, sur-
prise.  
The emergency provision of healthcare, food, water, and shelter, may be considered a 
form of ex post insurance. Similar ex post insurance programs may also attempt to replace 
income and assets lost from unpleasant surprises that cannot be fully insured. Again, qualify-
ing for such programs is similar to ordinary insurance programs, because only those damaged 
by the surprise qualify. Again, the cash payments may come from reserves (funds) that are 
“usually” sufficient for the required payouts. Such programs often “bail out” those whose 
losses are greatest and whose problems may have produced subsequent crises (pandemics, 
civil disorder, or bank runs).  
Again, some surprise events are too large or unusual to be paid out of such pre-paid 
funds assembled before the event. This implies that the largest payouts will be paid for after 
the event, if at all. Ex post insurance, by its nature, is difficult for private markets to provide, 
because the payments go to those damaged by events that were not widely anticipated and so 
could not be prepaid in the normal way with insurance fees. Consequently, ex post insurance 
is normally provided by nonprofit agencies and governments, rather than private firms.  
Unfortunately, if used routinely for all unpleasant surprises, bailouts may contribute to 
subsequent crises by weakening incentives to adopt robust (prudent) plans. For example,  
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more expensive, but fragile, housing might be built in flood plans or along sea coasts, and 
financiers may adopt riskier (less robust) investment strategies, with smaller private provi-
sions (reserves) set aside for unpleasant surprises. Ex post insurance programs are not always 
trivial in size, as evident in the most recent financial crisis, and the increase in the magnitude 
of “surprise payouts” tends to be magnified by changes in behavior of those who expect to be 
bailed out.  
As a consequence, routine bailout policies can also exacerbate crises – as might be 
said of the Irish government’s 2008-10 response to its banking crisis. By promising too much, 
an entire government or economy’s finances may be undermined, by being exposed to new 
unpleasant fiscal surprises associated with such promised “emergency” support. This suggests 
that robust bail out programs will limit, rather than eliminate, the extent to which those af-
fected by unpleasant surprises are insured against losses. 
 
V.  Crisis Management 
Unfortunately, experience suggests that unpleasant surprises and their consequences 
do not always fall within neat, easily handled bounds, and so planning, robust plans, and bai-
louts also occasionally fail. The world is not simple and small enough to avoid all unpleasant 
surprise or limit their losses at an acceptable cost – if it is possible at all.  
A.  The nature of a crisis and the nature of crisis management 
At times when robust plans and ex post insurance programs fail, active crisis man-
agement becomes necessary. In such cases, old plans may no longer be feasible (the bridge is 
out), or may now yield such low payoffs that new plans, even if mistake prone, are likely to 
be improvements over current ones. One has to run for the hills before a tsunami wave ar-
rives. Taking a route that is a bit longer and leads to a somewhat more distant hill than neces-
sary may produce a better result than sitting down, pulling out a map, and determining the 
quickest route to the closest hill likely to remain above water. By the time this analysis is un-
dertaken, the decisionmaker may be underwater. 
During times of crisis, existing plans have to be quickly revised to limit losses. The 
problems associated with crisis management thus include those associated with surprise  
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events and ignorance, but also include problems associated with the need for a quick response 
in a setting in which the options and consequences of one’s actions are not fully understood. 
Crisis managers are ignorant of the best alternatives, and are not likely to discover the best 
response to the new circumstances in time available. Responses to crises, thus, include analyt-
ical errors, as well as mistakes associated with ignorance. 
The problems associated with crisis are analogous to that of numerical analysis of 
process that cannot be easily represented as a function or correspondence, and so cannot be 
analyzed with conventional mathematical tools. A function may not be concave or conti-
nuous, yet still have a maximum. That maximum (best action) may be found through syste-
matic trials and error – using a “hill climbing” algorithm that maps some domain of circums-
tances (C) into possible decisions and results (D). A hill climbing program substitutes values 
(ci) into a simulation or function with complex properties and computes the value [di = f(ci)], 
and then tries to find other values (cj) that produce a higher result (dj > di). This process is 
repeated until no higher points on the function can be found. Each step takes time to compute, 
and when only a limited number of steps is possible, because of time constraints, one is un-
likely to find the exact maximum of even fairly well-behaved functions. To make this less 
abstract, consider the difficulty of finding the highest point in a hilly area or local mountain 
range in just a few days, without a map or compass.   
Natural ignorance and the need for a rapid response imply that decisions reached dur-
ing a time of crisis will be unusually error prone. Even in cases in which the best response is 
potentially knowable [as in the case where di = f(ci), for all ci   C, with di   D and D   R], the 
best response is not likely to be identified in short time period, unless the relationships of in-
terest are fairly simple. Careful analysis and planning generally produce better results than 
quick reactions, because they allow a more thorough evaluation of alternative strategies, given 
what is known, and also because additional time allows further reduction of natural ignorance. 
During a crisis, the short-run advantages of rapid response trump (or appear to trump) those 
of careful analysis and planning. 
Such settings were so common in former times that we (and many other animals) have 
genetically transmitted rapid response mechanisms, the “flight or fight” reaction. In civilized 
society the “fight or flight” reaction is rarely needed and/or rarely induces the best immediate  
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response, because crises differ from those in our less organized past. Evidently, mankind’s 
institutional and cultural innovations have reduced the frequency those ancient natural crises, 
and so there is usually a bit of time for reflection in most crisis settings, although not as much 
as in normal times. The socially transmitted “take a deep breath” norm encourages a bit of 
calm analysis before reacting to an unpleasant surprise. Not all such surprises are crises. 
Nonetheless, unpleasant surprises that are best responded to quickly are relatively 
common, and most people have routines for dealing with minor crises (although panic re-
mains a common initial reaction).  
Most organizations use a broad cross-section of their personnel to address unpleasant 
surprises such as equipment failure, personnel health problems, and supply-chain timing prob-
lems. Such problems are in a sense predictable, that is to say they are “bound to happen,” but 
the details vary widely and unusual cases will require creative efforts to solve the associated 
problems within and among organizations.  
In large organizations, significant specialization with respect to types of crises often 
occurs. Crisis response teams may also have responsibility for devising robust plans that 
avoid the need for rapid creative responses through contingency planning and reserve capaci-
ty. Within most organizations, delegation and specialization are used to reduce damages from 
quick decisions. Small day-to-day crises are handled at lower levels of authority. Any mis-
takes made by low-level managers will tend to have smaller damages and be easier to correct.  
For much the same reasons, streamlined decisionmaking procedures during times of 
crisis tend to be narrowly focused on the crisis at hand in order to reduce agency problems 
and mistakes. Clear lines of responsibility are also useful, so that mistakes, malfeasance, and 
incompetence can be readily identified and punished. The same approach allows managers to 
be assessed for their relative abilities at crisis management – creative successful responses to 
nasty surprises – and promoted if they are unusually skilled at crisis management. The larger 
the crisis, the further up an organization’s decisionmaking hierarchy it tends to be addressed.  
Extreme cases, existential crises, will involve top management, who may task crisis 
management teams with discretion to make a variety of decisions without much immediate 
oversight. Major crisis response problems can be subcontracted to organizations that special-
ize in crisis management, but such subcontractors are unlikely to be given direct authority to  
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respond to major emergencies.  
That mistakes often result from crisis management has given rise to a variety of com-
mon expressions for such mistakes: “decisions reached in the heat of a moment” or “during 
the fog of war.” Because such mistakes are anticipated, standing procedures for addressing 
crisis management normally include ex post review and error correction procedures.  
That less review and analysis are undertaken before decisions are made, does not 
mean that crisis management decisions are ever carefully reviewed, only such reviews can 
only be undertaken after many of the response decisions are made. Because more mistakes 
tend to be made during times of crisis than in ordinary times, procedures for review are even 
more likely to be useful after a major emergency. 
Procedures for ex post analysis, review, and error correction would not be necessary 
unless mistakes and agency problems were commonplace and/or costly. 
B.  Democratic Governance and Crisis Management 
All organizations face crises of various sizes, and governments are not exceptions. In 
addition to the usual range of unpleasant surprises associated with the production of services 
and enforcement of laws, voters often require their governments to take steps to reduce un-
pleasant surprises in the private sector (as with health and fire code regulation, and with bank-
ing and insurance regulation). They are also likely to demand that governments provide ex 
post crisis insurance in areas in which private insurers fears to tread – often because unplea-
sant surprises are deemed too commonplace. As a consequence, the scope of governmental 
involvements in crisis and crisis management is unusually broad. Indeed, it can be argued that 
risk management, insurance, bailouts, and crisis management motivate most of the expendi-
tures and regulations undertaken by democratic governments. The large scale of government 
operations and the ability to use taxation to provide resources for ex post insurance programs 
and crisis management allow government to address many problems not addressable by pri-
vate organizations. 
However, dealing with unpleasant surprises remains problematic within all organiza-
tions, and the magnitude of government efforts may produce other problems – many of which 
will be unpleasant surprises for voters. Crisis management by governments tends to be some-
what more problematic than that by individuals and organizations, because monitoring and  
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error correction are difficult to motivate and implement in democratic organizations. Voters, 
as well as bureaucrats, will be affected by both rational and natural ignorance. But, both 
elected officials and bureaucrats may try to hide, rather than repair, their own mistakes. This 
is often easier to do during times of crisis. 
Crisis management naturally tends to increase the discretion of policymakers, while 
reducing monitoring and control by voters. Greater discretion is necessary to take the rapid 
steps necessary to reduce losses. Moreover, officeholders are unlikely to have previously 
stated how they will address the particular crises that emerge under their “watch,” so their 
strategies will not have been reviewed by voters, editorial writers, or think tanks. Crises also 
increase the knowledge asymmetries between voters and government experts.  
Both mistakes and political agency problems thus tend to be larger during times of cri-
sis. Recognizing this problem, voters will demand more information. They will read more 
newspapers, watch more news on television, which in turn will solicit information from “ex-
perts” of various kinds (whose relative merits are difficult to access). Policy-relevant informa-
tion will also be supplied by organizations with relatively more information on the issues that 
have to be addressed during the crisis, because their own interests are affected by the crisis.  
Voters will have little direct experience with the problems and solutions proposed dur-
ing times of crisis – essentially by definition, so they are less able to judge the quality of the 
information supplied. Few voters respond to floods, financial crises, or terrorist crises in the 
course of their ordinary lives. Relatively greater voter reliance on secondhand information 
makes them more susceptible to manipulation during times of crisis, than in policy areas in 
which voter assessments of policy are more firmly rooted in their own independent observa-
tions and judgment. Being aware of their own relatively greater ignorance, voters will defer to 
governmental and other experts during times of crisis.  
 All these effects tend to alter the informal balance between voters and elected offi-
cials in the short run in a manner that reduces voter control over public policy. Bureaus may 
secure larger budgets and interest groups may be able to secure more favorable tax or regula-
tory treatments than possible during ordinary times, because voters and their elected repre-
sentatives are more willing to accept the arguments and assertions of agency experts in times  
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of crisis than in ordinary times. They are also less able to monitor policy decisions, because 
many decisions are being made rapidly and simultaneously.  
Increased dependence on secondhand information tends to reduce the ability of major-
ity rule to function as an efficient information aggregation process (Congleton 2004), and the 
need for rapid responses largely rules out the use of referenda and elections as decisionmak-
ing procedures. Indeed, the increased influence of interest groups and demand for news dur-
ing times of crisis provides such groups with an incentive to “manufacture” public policy 
crises. “Ideological shirking” may also increase as elected politicians may advance policy 
agendas of their own with less fear of voter retribution (at least in the short run) or simply use 
their ideologies as a lens through which to understand the events at hand. 
This reduction in the effectiveness of voter and legislative oversight is important be-
cause government decisions affect so many people and resources, which implies that mistakes 
are more likely to produce crisis cascades: a series of connected crises that require rapid poli-
cy decisions. 
C.  Robust Constitutions 
All of the predictions about other groups and organizations will apply to well-run gov-
ernments, as well as to smaller private organizations. Governments will have standing rou-
tines for bounding losses from unpleasant surprises: analysis of possible crisis scenarios, ro-
bust plans and institutions, with fudge factors and reserves will be evident. Delegation, re-
view, and error correction procedures will be adopted to reduce losses in the short and long 
run. The nature of the losses of interest to political decisionmakers, however, tends to differ 
from those in private organizations. The goals of organizational actors are always at least 
partly institutionally induced by the organization’s own selection and reward procedures. In 
the case of national governments, those standing selection and reward procedures are deter-
mined by constitutional law and other durable quasi-constitutional rules and norms. Lost 
votes, for example, will be more important to elected official, than lost dollars. 
There are a variety of methods through which potential losses associated with delegat-
ing crisis management authority can be bounded. For example, to assure that emergency deci-
sionmaking procedures are temporary and that normal decisionmaking procedures are reins-
tated as quickly as possible, the standing procedures of crisis management may specify per- 
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sons (other than those charged with crisis management) to determine when the crisis has 
ended. Similarly, the legislature, or legislative committees, may formally delegate only tem-
porarily authority to a crisis manager or to the chief executive that expires after a predeter-
mined period. 
The mistake-prone nature of all crisis management implies that durable rule changes – 
constitutional amendments – during times of crisis should be avoided to the extent possible, 
because changes in the fundamental procedures and constraints of governance are difficult to 
reverse. This is another reason why the constitutional amendment procedures of robust gov-
ernments tend to be more difficult to satisfy than those for adopting ordinary laws. Such rules 
make it less likely that constitutional mistakes will be made during a crisis.  
Even during an extraordinary crisis in which constitutional procedures fail, temporary, 
rather than permanent changes to decisionmaking processes are preferable to constitutional 
reforms. Constitutional mistakes can be far more costly than ordinary policy mistakes, be-
cause they are more difficult to reverse than policy mistakes. To avoid durable mistakes, pro-
cedures for dealing with crises and constitutional amendments should be designed, imple-
mented, and revised during times that are relatively free of crisis. As noted above, given time 
for careful analysis and review, fewer mistakes are likely to be made.
4  
A constitution that has stood the test of time is likely to have procedures for crisis 
management are robust and relatively crisis proof themselves. This does not mean that they 
are completely crisis proof, but that for the range of crises experienced, the crisis responses 
have evidently not exacerbated the crises addressed and have not overridden, threatened, or 
undermined the government’s core decision procedures and constraints.  
Through time, a wide range of crises will be experienced, which allows constitutional 
designers and reformers to learn from the mistakes of past designs, even if they cannot, them-
selves, imagine all future unpleasant surprises or crises. Durable constitutional regimes en-
courage prudent contingency planning, effective crisis management, and error correction. 
 
 
                                                 
4 It should be noted that many constitutions lack such provisions, and have been undone by “temporary” delega-
tions of authority to a general or chief executive. For example, Napoleon, Mussolini, and Hitler gained their 
great discretionary authority largely through emergency powers provisions of their constitutions.  
25 
 
D.  Surprise, crisis, and scientific progress 
As noted above, crises often create opportunities to learn from unexpected events, 
consequences, and mistakes. Both pleasant and unpleasant surprises encourage old plans to be 
revised and new theories to be developed, as noted above. The same logic applies to scientific 
and technological progress, in general. The work of individual scientists and scientific organi-
zations is often punctuated and accelerated by surprises, unexpected results, unlikely coinci-
dences, and anomalies. This is one reason why the experimental method has proven to be so 
useful. Indeed, even unplanned lab experiments (accidents) can produce useful surprises. For 
example, lab accidents created both nylon and penicillin, two major modern discoveries. “Im-
possible” outcomes (anomalies) often stimulate the formation and testing of new theories that 
occasionally make the formerly impossible completely predictable.  
Anomolies (unpleasant surprises, given a particular theory) often induce a subset of 
scientists to consider entirely new issues and possibilities, at the same time that ordinary re-
search continues. In many cases, their efforts fail and the puzzles remain unsolved. In a few 
cases, however, a significant reduction in natural ignorance occurs as “breakthroughs” are 
made. In this manner, a scientific community often learns from its own mistakes and surpris-
es, but also from tacking unexpected new problems outside their previous range of expertise 
(Burke 1995). As a consequence, scientific progress often occurs when surprise events be-
come theoretical nuisances for much the same reason that innovation at the level of individu-
als tends to be accelerated by unpleasant surprises and personal crises. It allows scientists to 
break free of their more or less routine Bayesian processes of learning.  
It bears noting that not all scientifically relevant crises are intellectual ones. Similar 
scientific advances are often stimulated by large-scale crises such as wars, epidemics, and 
major recessions, for many of the somewhat similar reasons. Moreover, urgency would not 
generate policy problems without knowledge problems, and this tends to be obvious during 
times of crisis. A crisis increases demand for policy-relevant information, and new expendi-
tures on data and analysis often produce useful knowledge. New expenditures, both private 
and public, tend to reduce natural ignorance in fields that can help ameliorate the current cri-
sis or prevent future crises. In this manner, major social crises may indirectly promote both 
scientific and technological breakthroughs, what Kuhn (1995) calls paradigm shifts.  
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There are many cases in which major innovations have been produced as part of a re-
sponse to a major crisis. For example, the list of scientific and engineering innovations devel-
oped during times of war is impressive. Among these were the mass production of penicillin 
(which Fleming had never been able to master), synthetic rubber, radar, early computers, jet 
airplanes, rockets, nuclear fission, and a host of technologies without obvious peacetime ap-
plications. As the saying in English goes, “necessity is the mother of all invention.” Necessity 
is often a by-product of surprise and innovation a consequence of reductions in natural ignor-
ance induced by surprise. 
 
VI. Summary and conclusions 
This paper has argued that ignorance is widely recognized to produce a variety of 
problems and that attempting to bound the losses of such problems produces a variety of more 
or less predictable responses by forward looking decisionmakers. Thus, although the exis-
tence of ignorance undermines several presumptions about rational behavior, it also produces 
explanations for a good deal of behavior that might otherwise have been deemed irrational. 
Given information costs and natural ignorance, expectations will be either because informa-
tion is too costly to be collected, or because the information necessary to form unbiased esti-
mates is beyond the scope of an individual’s knowledge. Insofar as unbiased estimates are 
necessary for decisionmakers to make the right choices, even forward looking consistent 
people will make systematic mistakes in their daily lives, although they may have few regrets.  
Natural ignorance also allows the possibility of genuine behavioral innovations, which 
implies that the observed behavior of individuals, who are fundamentally consistent, will ap-
pear to be inconsistent through time. The latter is not a problem for the individuals involved, 
but for theorists who anticipates observing consistent behavior as consequence of assuming 
both rationality (forward looking consistent decisionmaking) and complete knowledge of the 
decision environment. Given the possibility of surprises and innovation, inconsistent behavior 
may simply demonstrate that a problem (surprise) has been addressed and solved. 
That surprises and mistakes are common provides individuals with evidence that natu-
ral ignorance exists, without providing information about what they are ignorant of. That indi-
rect knowledge of their ignorance provides forward-looking decisionmakers with good rea- 
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sons to take a variety of steps that can be taken to cope with surprise events. For example, 
they will adopt plans that are robust, rather than optimized in all details. Simon’s (1955, 
1978) observations about rules of thumb and satisficing behavior are likely to reflect efforts to 
achieve such robust plans. Robust plans do not maximize risk-adjusted expected values in the 
usual sense of the term, but yield results that are acceptable and avoid catastrophes in a broad 
range of circumstances – not all of which are known beforehand.  
Organizations, similarly will adopt robust plans, and also adopt robust decisionmaking 
procedures that can cope with large and small surprises in a manner that limits losses from 
them. Authority will be delegated to “low”-level members of management to “put out fires,” 
because such fires need to be put out or they will cause major problems for the organization. 
Mistakes can be corrected and long run plans improved after short run decisions are made.  
As part of those plans, reserves of various types may be created as a means of bound-
ing the losses associated with the “usual” unpleasant surprises. These insurance-like funds are 
not truly instances of self insurance, because by unpleasant surprises are unanticipated and not 
easily represented in the usual statistical manner. They are uncertain events rather than risky 
ones, to use Knight’s terminology. Thus, it is difficult to design prepaid insurance instruments 
to cover all surprises, and profit-making firms will not sell such policies, because it is known 
that a single large unpleasant surprise (major earthquake, hurricane, or nuclear disaster) would 
bankrupt the company. Indeed, the recent meltdown of mortgage-backed security markets 
reveals how difficult it is to cope with even relatively modest unpleasant surprises – a totally 
unexpected 20 percent decline in housing prices.  
That such surprises are acknowledged to be possibilities, implies that government in-
volvement in risk management is both necessary and likely. Some types of regulations that 
can reduce unpleasant surprises may be unlikely to be adopted by for profit companies, be-
cause they may profit in the short run by gambling that “they” will not be surprised or be 
gone before a nasty really surprise occurs. Ex post insurance may be demanded, but many not 
be provided in the private sector. These suggest that governments are likely to play a signifi-
cant role in managing major unpleasant surprises in the “private sector,” as well as ones that 
emerge in its own service and regulatory domains.   
28 
 
 Yet government efforts to reduces losses from unpleasant surprises is problematic for 
several reasons. Mistakes are inevitable during times of crisis, because natural ignorance af-
fects policymakers, bureaucrats, and voters. Moreover, information asymmetries increase and 
the resultant agency problems allow some interest groups, firms, and individuals to profit 
from the rapid, weakly monitored decisions that are required during times of crisis. Otherwise 
robust democratic constitutions, as opposed to more authoritarian ones, may fail during times 
of crisis because they fail to properly delegate and constraint emergency powers deemed ne-
cessary during times of crisis.  
To conclude: this paper has argued that behavior associated with self-acknowledged 
ignorance is of both theoretical and practical interest, although it is widely left out of rational 
choice-based models of economic and political decisionmaking. A variety of steps will pre-
dictably be taken by forward looking decisionmakers who are aware of their own ignorance 
and/or continually surprised by the circumstances they face. Decisions and programs that re-
duce losses from unpleasant surprises often look different from those which maximize ex-
pected values. They have larger reserves, include provisions for error correction, and are, 
nonetheless, occasionally inadequate.  
The large number of cases in which ignorance affects personal, organizational, and 
governmental behavior suggests that the neglect of ignorance and surprise by mainstream 
economics may unnecessarily and mistakenly limit the scope of rational choice-based analy-





Binmore, K. 1992. Fun and Games. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
Binmore, K. 2011. Rational Decisions. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Burke, J. 1995. Connections. New York: Little, Brown, and Co. 
Congleton, R. D. 2001. “Rational Ignorance, Rational Voter Expectations, and Public Policy: 
A Discrete Informational Foundation for Fiscal Illusion.” Public Choice 107: 35–64. 
Congleton, R. D. 2005. “Toward a Political Economy of Crisis Management: Rational 
Choice, Ignorance, and Haste in Political Decisionmaking,” Dynamics of Intervention, 
Advances in Austrian Economics 8: 183–204. 
Congleton, R. D. 2007. “Informational Limits to Democratic Public Policy: The Jury Theo-
rem, Yardstick Competition, and Ignorance,” Public Choice 132: 333–52. 
Conlisk, J. 1996. “Why Bounded Rationality?” Journal of Economic Literature 34: 669–700. 
Coase, R. H. 1937. “The Nature of the Firm.” Economica 4: 386–405. 
Cyert, R. M. and M. H. DeGroot. 1974. “Rational Expectations and Bayesian Analysis.” 
Journal of Political Economy 82: 521–36. 
Dudley, L. M. 1991. The Word and the Sword: How Techniques of Information and Violence 
Have Shaped Our World. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Feigenbaum, S. and D. M. Levy. 1996. “The Technological Obsolescence of Scientific 
Fraud.” Rationality and Society 8: 261–76. 
Fox, C. R. and A. Tversky. 1995. “Ambiguity Aversion and Comparative Ignorance.” Quar-
terly Journal of Economics 110: 585–603. 
Fremling, G. and J. Lott. 1996. “The Bias Towards Zero in Aggregate Perceptions: An Expla-
nation Based on Rationally Calculating Individuals.” Economic Inquiry 34: 276–95. 
Frydman, R. 1982. “Towards an Understanding of Market Processes: Individual Expectations, 
Learning, and Convergence to Rational Expectations Equilibrium.” American Eco-
nomic Review 72: 652–68. 
Hayek, F. A. 1945. “The Use of Knowledge in Society.” American Economic Review 35: 
519–30. 
Hirshleifer, J. and J. G. Riley. 1992. The Analytics of Uncertainty and Information. New 
York: Cambridge University Press.  
30 
 
Good, I. J. 1976. “The Bayesian Influence, or How to Sweep Subjectivism under the Carpet.” 
In Harper and Hooker (eds.), Foundations of Probability Theory. Dordrecht, Holland: 
D. Reidel Publishing. 
Kirzner, I. 1973. Competition and Entrepreneurship. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
Knight, F. 1921. Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Kuhn, T. S. 1995. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Third edition. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press.  
Mas-Colell, A., M. D. Whinston, and J. R. Green. 1995. Microeconomic Theory. Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press. 
North, D. C. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
O’Driscoll, G. P., Jr. and M. J. Rizzo. 1996. The Economics of Time and Ignorance. London 
and New York: Routledge. 
Popper, K. R. 1957. The Poverty of Historicism. London: Routledge. 
Rubinstein, A. 1998. Modeling Bounded Rationality. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Schumpeter, J. R. 1942. Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. New York: Harper and Row. 
Shackle, G. L. S. 1969. Decision Order and Time in Human Affairs. London: George Allen 
and Unwin. 
Shannon, C. E. and W. Weaver. 1949. The Mathematical Theory of Communication. Urbana: 
The University of Illinois Press. 
Simon, H. A. 1955. “A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice.” Quarterly Journal of Econom-
ics 69: 99–118. 
Simon, H. A. 1978. “Rationality as Process and as Product of Thought.” American Economic 
Review 68: 1–16. 
Stigler, G. J. 1961. “The Economics of Information.” Journal of Political Economy 69: 213–
25. 
















DP-CIW 1/2011:  Die Gemeinschaft der Lehrenden und Lernenden: Festvortrag zur Promo-
tionsfeier der Wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Fakultät am 24. November 2010 
in der Aula des Schlosses 
  Alexander Dilger 
  Januar 2011 
 
DP-CIW 2/2011:  Plädoyer für eine problemorientierte, lerntheoretisch und fachlich fundierte 
ökonomische Bildung 
Gerd-Jan Krol, Dirk Loerwald und Christian Müller 
  Februar 2011 
 
DP-CIW 3/2011:  Gefangen im Dilemma? Ein strategischer Ansatz der Wahl- und Revolutions-
teilnahme 
  Marie Möller 
  April 2011 
 
DP-CIW 4/2011:  Overconfidence and Team-Performance: An Analysis of NBA-Players’ Self-
Perception 
  Hannah Geyer, Hanke Wickhorst 
April 2011 
 
DP-CIW 5/2011:  Kompetenzziele für das allgemein bildende Fach „Wirtschaft / Ökonomie“ in 
der Sekundarstufe I 
  AGOEB - Arbeitsgruppe Ökonomische Bildung 




















   
Diskussionspapiere des 




































Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster 
CIW – Centrum für Interdisziplinäre Wirtschaftsforschung 
Scharnhorststr. 100 
D-48151 Münster 
 
Tel: +49-251/83-24303 
Fax: +49-251/83-28429 
 
www.wiwi.uni-muenster.de/ciw 